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TOWARDS A FIRM-BASED THEORY OF
CONSUMPTION
David G. Yosifon

ABSTRACT
Corporate theory typically construes consumption activity as
involving a series of arms-length, atomistic transactions in which
consumers exchange money for discrete corporate goods or services.
Canonical accounts expect satisfied consumers to engage in repeat
transactions, but the transactions themselves are (implicitly or
explicitly) assumed to be isolated, fully contained dealings with the
firm. Such a view of consumption supports the inference that
consumers can readily manage their own interests in corporate
operations through serial decisions to “take it,” “leave it,” repeat, or
refuse to repeat patronization of a firm. This assessment plays an
important part in justifying American corporate governance law,
which charges corporate directors with fiduciary obligations only to
shareholders, not consumers or other stakeholders. In this Article, I
begin to explore some ways in which consumer associations with the
corporate “nexus of contracts” are more relational and
indeterminate, and less atomistic, than mainstream corporate
theory typically presumes. I draw on and extend Ronald Coase’s
transactional theory of the firm by exploring ways in which some
important consumption decisions are made “in-house” by firm
managers rather than “in the market” by individual consumers.
This positive theory of “firm-based consumption” poses a challenge
to the view that corporate governance law should require directors
to manage firms exclusively on behalf of shareholders.
INTRODUCTION
Consumption is a fundamental part of life. We must consume
air, water, and food to stay alive. More than mere survival,
consumption is an important technique through which we make our
lives fully human.
We express ourselves and forge group

 Assistant Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law. I would like
to express my sincere thanks to Alan Palmiter, Kent Greenfield, and the editors
of the Wake Forest Law Review’s Symposium, “The Sustainable Corporation,”
for their invitation to participate in this symposium. My thanks to Marx Sexton
for her help in obtaining research materials.
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associations, in part, through our consumption patterns.1
Influential economic and political theories hold that our social
prosperity is dependent upon extensive and deepening patterns of
Consumption activity is creeping ever more
consumption.2
pervasively into the lives of people already living in consumer-based
societies, and more and more societies the world over are becoming
consumer based.3 How we consume is in part a function of our
social, economic, and legal institutions. In this Article, I explore
some undertheorized aspects of the corporate organization of
consumption.4 In particular, by drawing on and extending Ronald
Coase’s work on the theory of the firm,5 I explore ways in which
some consumption decisions are made “in-house” by corporate
managers, rather than “in the market” by individual consumers.6 I
then argue that this analysis of “firm-based consumption” presents a
new challenge to prevailing justifications of the view (presently
dominant in corporate theory and corporate law) that corporate
directors should manage firms exclusively on behalf of shareholders.
I. CONSUMERS IN THE CORPORATE NEXUS
The corporation is a “nexus of contracts” comprised of all those
1. See Albert C. Lin, Virtual Consumption: A Second Life for Earth, 2008
BYU L. REV. 47, 62 (“Consumption often involves an attempt to satisfy
nonmaterial needs—such as affection, participation, relationship, and
understanding—through material means.”) (emphasis added) (citing Tim
Jackson, Live Better by Consuming Less?, 9 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 19, 25 (2005)).
See also id. at 64 (“[C]onsumption choices can also serve as a means of
liberation from the constraining norms of closed communities.”).
2. See Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship:
Challenging the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783, 802–07
(2003) (attributing these ideas to the influence of economist John Maynard
Keynes).
3. See Lin, supra note 1 (reviewing the rapid expansion of consumption
across the globe, emphasizing the adverse environmental impact of such
consumption, and exploring the possibility that “virtual” consumption may offer
a solution to adverse environmental impact of this pattern, but concluding that
such a solution is not very promising).
4. This work builds on my recent scholarship, which has endeavored to
flesh out a more robust conception of the consumer interest in the corporation
than is otherwise available in corporate law scholarship. See generally David G.
Yosifon, The Consumer Interest in Corporate Law, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 253
(2009) [hereinafter Consumer Interest]; David G. Yosifon, The Public Choice
Problem in Corporate Law: Corporate Social Responsibility after Citizens
United, 89 N.C. L. REV. 1197 (2011) [hereinafter Public Choice Problem]; David
G. Yosifon, Discourse Norms as Default Rules: Structuring Corporate Speech to
Multiple Stakeholders, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 189 (2011) [hereinafter Discourse
Norms].
5. See Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
6. As this Article has been developed for a symposium on the “sustainable
corporation,” the focus here will be on the ways in which consumer preferences
for sustainable consumption are sometimes managed “in-house,” within the
firm, rather than through individual consumer transactions in the market.
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with a stake in the firm’s operations, including shareholders,
workers, consumers, and the broader social and political
community.7 Under the prevailing view, shareholders are the
exclusive beneficiaries of fiduciary obligations from corporate
directors not because shareholders “own” the corporation, but
because shareholders have a unique need for fiduciary ties in firm
governance that other stakeholders can do without.8
Once shareholders invest their capital in corporate enterprise,
they have little ability to control or monitor its use.9 After they turn
over their money, shareholders are entitled only to whatever
“residual” profits directors decide to pay in dividends after all other
corporate obligations have been satisfied (e.g., payments to
creditors, wages for workers, taxes to the state, etc.).10 The inability
of dispersed shareholders to control corporate operations, combined
with rank indeterminacy in what they are owed, leaves shareholders
with little confidence that turning capital over to the firm would be
a good idea. One of corporate law’s basic solutions to this problem of
shareholder vulnerability is to make directors fiduciaries,
exclusively, of shareholders.11 Directors are charged with managing
firm operations on behalf of shareholders without, at the end of the
day, any formal regard for themselves or non-shareholding

7. Commentators employing “nexus of contracts” models of the corporation
usually presuppose, typically without elaboration, that consumers are part of
the “nexus,” along with investors, workers, and communities. See REINIER
KRAAKMAN ET AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 6 (2004) (“[A] firm
fundamentally serves as a nexus of contracts: a single contracting party that
coordinates the activities of suppliers of inputs and of consumers of products
and services.”); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm, 3
J. FIN. ECON. 305, 307 (1976) (describing the corporation as being “in a very real
sense only a multitude of complex relationships (i.e., contracts) between the
legal fiction (the firm) and the owners of labor, material and capital inputs and
the consumers of output”).
8. For authoritative justifications of modern corporate theory and
doctrine, see generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, THE NEW CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE (2008); FRANK H. EASTERBOOK & DANIEL
R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW (1991); Henry
Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439 (2001).
9. My focus here is on large, publicly traded corporations. Closely held
firms present unique analytic challenges, which I do not address here. See
STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 797–842 (2002)
(summarizing governance issues unique to close corporations).
10. Once shareholders turn over their capital to a corporation, they cannot
demand that the firm cash them out by buying back their shares. This
exacerbates shareholder agency problems. Shareholders can alienate their
shares on secondary markets, but only at a price that is discounted by whatever
corporate problems (managerial or otherwise) are motivating the sale. See
LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 71–72 (2010); infra note
27.
11. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 28–30.
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stakeholders, “however hard the abnegation.”12
Nonshareholding corporate stakeholders must rely on
nonfiduciary mechanisms to guard their interests. According to the
standard account, workers are intimately involved in firm
operations (physically, at the plant, or through electronic
communications) and can therefore monitor their interests and
negotiate their interest in corporate operations with firm managers
either individually or collectively through unions.
Moreover,
workers’ fundamental stake in the firm is wages, which unlike
“residual” profits, can be contractually specified, ex ante, with
precision. They therefore do not need fiduciary attention in firm
governance.13
Critical corporate scholars have repudiated this view, arguing
that workers, like shareholders, also have unfixed, indeterminate
interests in corporate operations.14 After all, workers want not only
wages, but also job security, raises, promotions, and safe working
conditions. Once they invest their human capital (learning and
becoming expert at firm-specific tasks) it becomes more and more
difficult for laborers to “exit” a particular corporate nexus by
quitting and getting work at a different firm. Without a credible
threat of exit, it becomes easier for directors to deal sharply with
workers as one way of satisfying corporate law’s central command
that directors pursue profits for shareholders.15 Further, some
important elements of employment are difficult for workers to
monitor on their own. It is at least as hard for workers to spot
asbestos hiding in construction materials, or carpel-tunnel
syndrome lurking in repetitive key strokes, as it is for shareholders
to see the frailty of investments in bundled subprime mortgages.
Because of the irreducibly relational nature of corporate
employment, critical corporate scholars have sometimes argued that
corporate boards should be required to serve as fiduciaries of
workers in addition to shareholders.16
Fewer scholars have critically examined the nature of the
consumer interest in corporate operations.17 Neither theorists nor
the law have thought it necessary to afford consumers fiduciary
protections in firm governance. Corporations, the standard account
goes, must already serve consumer interests if they hope to stay in

12. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 548 (N.Y. 1928) (describing
fundamental requirements of fiduciary obligation); see also Bainbridge, supra
note 8, at 53 (“[T]he shareholder wealth maximization norm . . . indisputably is
the law in the United States.”).
13. See KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW 57–60 (2007).
14. See id. at 41–71 (synthesizing and extending corporate law scholarship
critical of shareholder primacy, largely from the labor perspective).
15. Id. at 52–53.
16. Id. at 60–71.
17. See Consumer Interest, supra note 4, at 261–63.
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business at all—neither taxes nor wages, creditors nor shareholders,
can be paid unless consumers are satisfied and patronize the firm.18
Moreover, consumers can look after their own interests by
inspecting corporate goods and services before making any
purchases. While consumers rarely negotiate the terms of their
deals with corporate operatives, the decision to “take” or “leave”
what firms offer is thought to be a sufficient contract-based
safeguard to protect consumer interests.19 Of course, consumers will
sometimes find it hard to evaluate important aspects of goods. It is
difficult, for example, for most consumers to inspect or understand
the relevance of nicotine levels in cigarettes, trans fats in french
fries, or escalating interest rates in home mortgages. Nevertheless,
mainstream corporate theory and extant law ascribe a protective
role in such circumstances not to corporate decision makers, but to
external government regulators who are charged with insulating
consumers from the pernicious effects of misleading advertising or
hazards that are difficult to observe.20
In previous work, I have challenged these fundamental
justifications for keeping consumer interests out of corporate boards’
formal responsibilities.21 First, wedded as it is to unreconstructed
“rational actor” and “common sense” conceptions of the sources of
individual behavior, corporate theory has failed to adequately
address what social science tells us about the ease with which
consumer perceptions of risk and other product attributes can be
manipulated by corporations through advertising and marketing
activity.22 Corporations may be serving shareholder interests not by
discerning and satisfying consumer preferences, but by inducing
preferences and manipulating perceptions.23 Second, corporate
theorists have failed to attend to the substantial public choice
problems that preclude the development of the external regulatory
structures that the canonical view claims should protect consumers
where individual judgment is inadequate or exploited.24 After all,
firms charged with maximizing shareholder profits will be
motivated to work within the political sphere to stunt the

18. See id. at 259–60.
19. See id.
20. This reliance on external government regulations, rather than internal
firm governance, is also prescribed to protect workers from health and safety
concerns that they cannot effectively protect themselves from through contract.
See GREENFIELD, supra note 13, at 60–66.
21. See supra note 4.
22. See Consumer Interest, supra note 4, at 261–70; see also Jon Hanson &
David Yosifon, The Situational Character: A Critical Realist Perspective on the
Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 169–70 (2004) (reviewing social science
emphasizing the general failure of human intuition to appreciate the magnitude
of situational influence over human behavior).
23. See Consumer Interest, supra note 4, at 169–71.
24. See Public Choice Problem, supra note 4, at 1198.
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development of such regulatory regimes in service to their
shareholders. After the Supreme Court held in Citizens United v.
Federal Elections Commission25 that the First Amendment forbids
government from stifling corporate political speech, corporate
interference in regulatory development will prove to be an even
more significant hitch in shareholder primacy theory.26 In light of
these problems, I have argued that it may be prudent for corporate
law to vindicate a voice for consumers not only at cash registers and
in the halls of government, but also in corporate board rooms, by
making directors actively attend to the interests of consumers at the
level of firm governance.
Here, I want to bracket my analysis of corporate manipulation
of consumer preferences and political processes and focus instead on
more deeply situating consumption activity within the general
theory of the firm. The positive assessment of the corporate
organization of consumption that I begin to sketch here will provide
a more complete foundation for my normative claim that corporate
boards, or some corporate boards, should be required to attend to
consumer interests at the level of firm governance.27
II. FIRM-BASED CONSUMPTION
While equity and (sometimes) labor are viewed as having
extended, unfixed relationships with the corporate nexus, corporate
theorists typically construe consumption activity as involving armslength, atomistic transactions in which consumers exchange money
for discrete corporate goods or services.28 Under the canonical
account, consumers might be expected to engage in repeat
transactions,29 but the transactions themselves are seen as isolated,
finite, fully contained dealings with the firm. The presumption that
consumers have simple, fixed, and determinate claims on the

25. 558 U.S. 50 (2010).
26. See Public Choice Problem, supra note 4, at 1199.
27. As the “Toward” in my title implies, this Article is the first step in what
will be an ongoing research project. I continue this analysis in a forthcoming
article, Locked-In: Shareholders, Consumers, and the Theory of the Firm
[hereinafter Locked-In] (draft on file with author), which explores ways in
which consumers can find themselves “locked-in” to consumption relationships
with particular firms. The problem of consumer “lock-in” presents a challenge
to prevailing views of corporate governance, which typically considers “lock-in”
to be a problem that only needs to be solved for shareholders.
28. See Consumer Interest, supra note 4, at 261–62.
29. Indeed, the imperative of encouraging repeat transactions in order to
keep the firm going is among the justifications that proponents of shareholder
primacy in firm governance give for why consumers do not need fiduciary
duties. See e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 4 (1991) (asserting that firms succeed by
promising and delivering what people value); see also id. at 38 (“The more
appealing the goods to consumers, the more profit.”).
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corporation is an important basis for the conclusion that consumers
can take care of their own interests and do not need fiduciary
attention in corporate governance. I believe that this presumption
oversimplifies contemporary consumption patterns, which are far
more relational in nature than is appreciated in mainstream
corporate theory.
A.

Consumption and Corporate Philanthropy

Recently I made my weekly trip to Whole Foods Market, Inc. (a
publicly traded company). Thrilled with my chosen lot of fresh fruit,
vegetables, breads, and prepared (but purportedly healthy)
delectables I had chosen, I paid for the goods and left the store. As I
pushed the grocery cart to my car I saw a notice printed on the sides
of the brown paper grocery bags announcing that on September 22,
Whole Foods would be giving 5% of its sales to something called the
California Coastal Cleanup Day. I thought to myself, is this a
promise or a threat? I wondered, why would Whole Foods give 5% of
the price it charges me for groceries to this cleanup project, instead
of reducing its prices by 5% such that I could then have a little extra
to spend on cancer prevention, the search for extra-terrestrial life,
prisoner rights advocacy, my still-festering law school loans, or, if I
wanted, coastal cleanup? Why would I be better off with Whole
Foods deciding how to spend this money than I would be if I made
the decision myself? Whole Foods might as well fill up my grocery
cart for me, and I could just meet them at the checkout. The
mystery deepens when you consider that if I donated to the Coastal
Cleanup with cash savings from reduced prices I could take a tax
deduction on the donation. At least with respect to the prepared
food I purchased, I had to pay sales tax on the purchase price (which
was inflated by the cost of the coastal cleanup contribution) and I
get no personal tax deduction for the money Whole Foods donates to
the Coastal Cleanup.30
For a moment I thought that maybe it really was a kind of
warning and that if I wanted no part of the cleanup I could just
avoid patronizing Whole Foods on September 22. But then I
realized that I had, obviously, already paid for part of the beach
cleanup through the prices on the purchases I had just made (before
I even learned about the Coastal Cleanup); indeed, I had paid for it
in the purchases I had made the previous week too, and the week
before that. The money that Whole Foods was going to use to pay
for the cleanup could have been used instead to lower prices
30. Corporations can deduct charitable contributions from their federal
income taxes (up to ten percent of their taxable income). See IRS Publication
526 (2010), Charitable Contributions, available at http://www.irs.gov
/publications/p526/index.html. This corporate tax savings may to some extent
be reflected in discounted prices to the consumer, but the discount would be less
than the possible savings available from foregoing coastal cleanup altogether.
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throughout the year. Or was Whole Foods trying to make me think
that the 5% for coastal cleanup would be coming only out of
“residual” profits, and thus coming from shareholders’ pockets,
rather than coming out of the gains-to-trade that all stakeholders in
the corporate enterprise, including workers and consumers, must
split?31
Perhaps Whole Foods is able to accomplish an economy of scale
by drawing consumers to its stores with promises of coastal
cleanups, economies that reduce the overall cost of produce to the
consumer.32 Indeed, one of the justifications that scholars and
courts propound for why corporations are permitted to make
charitable donations is that consumers like it and are more likely to
patronize firms that do it, thereby making such conduct profitable
for shareholders.33 But this just begs the question, why do promises
of coastal cleanups, rather than promises of greater cash savings,
attract consumers and produce this economy of scale? Upon further
inquiry (i.e., by Googling it), I learned that the California Coastal
Cleanup is also supported by contributions from, among others,
Oracle, Inc., Kohls, Inc., Delta, Inc., KPMG, Inc., Fairmont Hotels &
Resorts, Inc., and See’s Candies, Inc.34 It turns out that one’s
consumption of computer services, household goods, travel,
name, but then they lose such collateral benefits. They could make
ld make the donation conditional on the recianups and other
environmental ventures, and am happy to help pay for them. What
begs explicit analysis, however, is the realization that I am paying
for them not just through direct contributions, or through tax-andtransfer programs, but as part of my day-to-day consumption
activity. Of course, the California Coastal Cleanup is just one of
many charitable ventures supported by corporations. In 2009,

31. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of
Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 290–92 (1999) (emphasizing the role of the
board of directors in divvying up gains-to-trade among all stakeholders in
corporate enterprise).
32. Whole Foods’ corporate ethos generally expresses a commitment to
sound environmental practices. But a number of journalistic inquiries have
drawn attention to elements of Whole Foods’ business practices that may be
misleading in this regard. See, e.g., Field Maloney, Is Whole Foods Wholesome?,
SLATE, Mar. 17, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2138176/ (arguing that Whole
Foods misleads consumers about the amount of organic food it supplies from
small, family-owned farms and claiming that Whole Foods’ promotions “artfully
mislead customers about what they’re paying premium prices for”).
33. See, e.g., Victor Brudney & Allen Ferrell, Corporate Charitable Giving,
69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1191, 1192–94 (2002); Geoffrey Miller, Narrative and Truth in
Judicial Opinions: Corporate Charitable Giving Cases, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV.
831, 842–43.
34. See Press Release, Cal. Coastal Comm’n, California Coastal
Commission Announces the 26th Annual California Coastal Cleanup Day (Aug.
31,
2010),
available
at
http://www.coastal.ca.gov/publiced/ccd/8.31.10
.MediaAdvisory.pdf.
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American corporations made an estimated $14.4 billion in charitable
donations.35
In the penultimate section of this Article, I will turn to the issue
of consumers’ desire for goods that are produced and disseminated
in an environmentally sustainable fashion (rather than products
that are bundled with charitable contributions).36 I hold that issue
in abeyance in this Part in order to first square up the analytic
issues involved in “firm-based” consumption through two further
examples that I think introduce the issue in a more direct, graspable
fashion.
B.

Loyal Consumption

My highly organized wife is a proponent of cultivating and using
“points” or “miles” by participating in retail and credit card company
loyalty and reward programs. By staying as often as possible at
Marriott International, Inc. hotels, we generate “points” which can
be used for a “free” (ahem) hotel stay in the future.37 By using an
American Express, Inc. credit card to pay for all manner of
consumption, we can receive “free” (ahem) hotel rooms, baseball
tickets, household electronics, or gift cards for retailers, such as
Home Depot, Inc., or Linens ‘n Things, Inc.38 Consumer loyalty

35. See Charitable Giving Statistics, NAT’L PHILANTHROPIC TRUST,
http://www.npt.org/philanthropy/philanthropy_stats.asp (last visited Aug. 30,
2011). It is possible to analyze this as a “tying” problem under anti-trust laws
which prohibit firms with monopolistic power in one consumer market from
requiring consumers who want to purchase their product to also purchase a
distinct or “tied” product. See generally Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled
Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit Theory, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 397 (2009); Alan J. Meese, Tying Meets the New Institutional Economics,
146 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1997). Commentators appear to sometimes use the term
“bundle” to refer to benign or competitive “tying” arrangements. A stricter
usage refers to “bundles” as the discounted, grouped sale of two or more items
that are otherwise sold separately, and “ties” as sales of two or more items that
a firm will only sell together. See Daniel A. Crane, Mixed Bundling, Profit
Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare, 55 EMORY L. J. 423, 433 n. 38 (2006). Using
these terms, the coastal cleanup example appears to be a benign tie, because
the markets that I am describing, grocery stores (even health food stores),
clothing retailers, insurance, and candy are all quintessentially competitive
markets. The coastal cleanup is not, strictly speaking, bundled with these
firms’ goods, since the firms will not sell you soy milk, insurance, candy, etc.
without the slice of beach cleanup (i.e., will not reimburse your pro-rata share of
the contribution if you want to refuse to be a part of it). So again, the question
is why are these firms competing with ties (or more loosely, bundles) that
involve their own products and largely distinct sustainability initiatives, rather
than on price?
36. See infra text accompanying notes 80–93.
37. See Marriott Rewards, MARRIOTT, http://www.marriott.com/rewards
/rewards-program.mi (last visited Aug. 30, 2011).
38. See
Get
the
Card,
AMERICAN
EXPRESS,
http://getthecard.americanexpress.com/home (last visited Aug. 31, 2011).
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programs have a long and quirky history, but the modern practice
can be traced to the introduction of “frequent flyer” miles by
American Airlines, Inc. in 1981.39 The success of that program
spurred imitators not just in the airline industry, but throughout
retail markets.40 Analysts have found that the average American
consumer belongs to fourteen different rewards programs, and is
actively engaged in six of them.41 So why would a consumer prefer
to receive “points” that she can put towards future consumption of a
limited range of goods that American Express or some other
business offers through its rewards program, rather than receiving a
present cash discount (equal to whatever it costs the business to run
the rewards program), which she could then spend on anything at
all? This pattern is especially mysterious given robust evidence
from social psychology that consumers usually behave as “hyperbolic
discounters.”42 That is, consumers are generally thought to strongly
prefer more present consumption over the possibility of higher levels
of consumption in the future.43 Why do firms compete on the basis
of offering better “miles” or rewards programs, rather than on
price?44

39. See generally FREDERICK F. REICHHELD, LOYALTY RULES! (2001).
40. See id.
41. Tim Donnelly, How to Start a Customer Rewards Program, INC.COM
(Aug. 17, 2010), http://www.inc.com/guides/2010/08/how-to-start-a-customer
-rewards-program.html.
42. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 22, at 44–46 (reviewing studies on
hyberbolic discounting); Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A
Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1539–42
(1998) (exploring policy implications of hyberbolic discounting).
43. See Hanson & Yosifon, supra note 22, at 44–46.
44. Commentators have provided idiosyncratic explanations for specific
programs. For example, airline “miles” programs have been explained as a
method of (open) secret compensation for employees, who are reimbursed for
corporate (or law school) related travel by employers, but keep the accumulated
miles in their personal rewards account for future personal travel. Moreover,
this compensation has typically evaded taxation. See Abhijit Banerjee &
Lawrence Summers, On Frequent Flyer Programs and Other Loyalty-Inducing
Economic Arrangements, Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion
Paper Number 1337 (1987), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/501 (last
visited Aug. 21, 2011). Lawrence Ausebel has argued that credit card
companies compete on the basis of rewards programs rather than on interest
rates because most consumers (mistakenly) predict that they will use credit
cards merely for convenience and will not use the credit; they therefore do not
distinguish between interest rates when deciding which cards to patronize.
Lawrence M. Ausubel, The Failure of Competition in the Credit Card Market, 81
AM. ECON. REV. 50, 70–76 (1991). Others argue that rewards programs are the
bounty of transfers from the relatively poor, who cannot qualify for credit cards
with rewards programs, to relatively wealthy consumers who do use them, since
credit card interchange fees are impounded into the price of commodities by
retailers who do not offer discounts for cash payments (retailers are forbidden
by credit card companies from offering such discounts). See, e.g., Adam J.
Levitin, Priceless? The Economic Costs of Credit Card Merchant Restraints, 55
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Employee Consumption of Benefits

I am principally concerned here with analyzing the nature of
consumer associations with corporate enterprise. This task will be
aided by briefly considering an important employee-specific form of
firm-based consumption: employee benefits, or “in kind” employee
compensation programs. Such benefits most prominently include
health insurance, but also include maternity, paternity, and other
family leave programs, fitness and recreational programs, meals and
entertainment (group or individual tickets to baseball games, etc.),
and reduced costs for company products and services.45 A 2002
study by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce found that benefits
programs comprised a (surprisingly high) 42.3% of total employee
compensation for American workers.46
Why would a worker prefer to receive specific goods or services
as compensation rather than higher wages that the worker could
use to buy anything she wanted, including health insurance, opera
tickets, or coastal cleanups?
Analysts give two fundamental
explanations, only the second of which is directly relevant to the
present inquiry. First, unlike ordinary wages, some in-kind benefits
are not taxed as income under the United State Tax Code.47 These
include big-ticket, obvious items like health insurance, but also lessobvious, less-tractable items like “free” air conditioning in the
office.48 The tax explanation is important, but it is not complete, as
many benefits do count as income under the tax code.49 In fact, the
default rule is that benefits are taxed as income, although, as stated,
Examples of nonexcludable
there are important exceptions.50

U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1321 (2008). These interesting arguments undoubtedly go
some distance in explaining specific programs, but the ubiquity of rewards
programs in consumer markets suggests that something more general may help
explain their use. See Banerjee and Summers, supra, at 2. Moreover, these
accounts do not explain why airlines or credit cards attract consumers with
rewards offering a limited universe of consumption, rather than cash, which
consumers could put to any privately preferred use. I explore a “firm-based
consumption” explanation infra, text accompanying notes Part II.B.
45. Anthony M. Marino & Jan Zabojnik, A Rent Extraction View of
Employee Discounts and Benefits (Oct. 16, 2005), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=608041.
46. Id.
47. 26 U.S.C. § 132 (2006).
48. See generally Taxable Fringe Benefits Guide, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE
(2011),
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/fringe_benefit_fslg.pdf
(examining various benefits exempt from taxation under the Internal Revenue
Code).
49. Moreover, without some other explanation for benefits programs, we
might expect that many employees would still prefer to have cash, even if they
had to pay taxes on it, rather than taking a limited set of in-kind goods tax-free.
50. See Taxable Fringe Benefits Guide, supra note 48, at 7 (“In general,
taxable fringe benefits are reported when received by the employee and are
included in employee wages in the year the benefit is received.”) (citing 26

458

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

benefits include routine snacks and meals, athletic club
memberships, gift certificates to department stores, and the like.
The second, nontax explanation for why firms give employees
benefits instead of higher wages is that firms sometimes have a cost
advantage in procuring the in-kind item and can make it available
more cheaply than their employees could acquire it in the open
market.51 The cost advantage can be split between the firm and the
worker, making both better off than they would be if the firm paid
the worker enough cash to purchase the benefit outside of the firm.
As one scholar succinctly puts it: “When the firm can buy a benefit
for a lower cost than the employee could buy it on their own, the
firm is essentially acting as a buying agent for the worker.”52
III. A COASIAN APPROACH TO A FIRM-BASED THEORY OF
CONSUMPTION
A firm that wants to sell pencils might go into the open market
and contract with a woodchopper for the chopping of wood, then
make a deal with a graphite miner for the mining of graphite, then
contract with a designer for the pencil’s design, then make a deal
with a factory to compile all these elements into a pencil, which the
firm would then sell. Alternatively, a pencil business might
organize these production components “in-house” by employing and
deploying its own woodchoppers, miners, designers, and
manufacturers. How do firms decide how to organize pencil
production?
In his groundbreaking 1937 essay The Nature of the Firm,
Ronald Coase explained why production (pencil and otherwise) is
sometimes accomplished through a series of arms-length contractual
exchanges “in the market,” and at other times is organized by
command and control “in the firm.”53 Coase famously argued that
U.S.C. §451(a) (2006)).
51. See Marino & Zabojnik, supra note 45, at 1.
52. Darren Lubotsky, The Economics of Employee Benefits, in EMPLOYEE
BENEFITS: A PRIMER FOR HUMAN RESOURCE PROFESSIONALS 34 (Joseph Martoccio
ed., 2004). A third interesting (though not directly relevant to the present
inquiry) explanation for the prevalence of benefits in lieu of more cash is that it
provides employers a cheap mechanism through which to distinguish more
desirable from less desirable job applicants. See Marino & Zabojnik, supra note
45, at 10. For example, if firm managers believe that employees who exercise
regularly are likely to be more productive than workers who do not exercise,
then firms might find it useful to offer a mix of cash and gym memberships
rather than all cash as compensation. Workers who are likely to use the gym
membership will value it and be attracted to the compensation package, while
workers who do not value gym memberships will be less likely to apply for the
job. The compensation structure is a more reliable sorting mechanism than
would be simply asking applicants whether or not they enjoy exercising, which
might seem both rude and legally risky. See id.
53. See Coase, supra note 5. The Nature of the Firm was Coase’s first
article. He published it at the age of twenty-seven, reportedly based on a
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“[t]he main reason why it is profitable to establish a firm would
seem to be that there is a cost of using the price mechanism. The
most obvious cost of ‘organizing’ production through the price
mechanism is that of discovering what the relevant prices are.”54
The high cost of discovering—Coase includes the cost of
“negotiating” in this notion of discovery—prices for various inputs,
such as raw materials and labor, can sometimes make it cheaper to
just vertically integrate production components within one firm,
where the combination and use of such components is determined by
the day-to-day fiat of firm managers, rather than continually
negotiated with outsiders.55
Coase’s “transactional” theory of the firm has had tremendous
influence in economics generally and in corporate law scholarship in
particular.56 Coase’s insights, however, have not been deployed to
make sense of consumption activity. Coase himself touched only
very briefly on the issue of consumption in his article. His one
statement on the matter comes in an obscure footnote to a famous
rhetorical question: “[W]hy, if by organizing one can eliminate
certain costs and in fact reduce the cost of production, are there any
market transactions at all?”57 The Coasian answer to the rhetorical
question is, of course, that in some circumstances transaction costs
in the market are lower than organizing (and monitoring) costs in
the firm.58 But in the footnote to his rhetorical question Coase
stumbles (well, Coase never stumbles, he jaunts) into consumption:
There are certain marketing costs which could only be
eliminated by the abolition of ‘consumers’ choice’ and these are
the costs of retailing. It is conceivable that these costs might
be so high that people would be willing to accept rations
because the extra product obtained was worth the loss of their
choice.59

I argue that this is not just conceivable, but is in fact
lecture he first developed at the age of twenty-one. See Donald N. McCloskey,
The Lawlerly Rhetoric of Coase’s The Nature of the Firm, 18 J. CORP. L. 425, 426
n.79 (1993).
54. Id. at 390.
55. Id. at 388 (“Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which
is co-ordinated through a series of exchange transactions on the market.
Within a firm, these market transactions are eliminated and in place of the
complicated market structure with exchange transactions is substituted the
entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs production.”).
56. See Jason Scott Johnston, The Influence of The Nature of the Firm on
the Theory of Corporate Law, 18 J. CORP. L. 213, 214 (1993).
57. Coase, supra note 5, at 394.
58. Id. at 395 (“[A] firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an
extra transaction within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the
same transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or the costs of
organizing in another firm.”).
59. Id. at 394 n.2.

460

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46

widespread in the contemporary corporate organization of
consumption. Where price information and other transaction costs
are relatively cheap, consumers prefer to make their own
consumption decisions through spot transactions “in the market.”
But where information and other transaction costs are high,
consumers fare better turning consumption decisions over to be
made “in-house” through firm governance.60 Just as the worker
sometimes gets higher wages by turning discretion over the use of
her labor to corporate managers, rather than bargaining for its use
in individual projects in the marketplace, and capital sometimes
receives higher returns by relinquishing to firm managers discretion
over how its money will be invested, so also does the consumer
sometimes do better turning over discretion regarding what exactly
will be consumed to firm managers. The consumer sometimes finds
it more efficient to eat what is “rationed” to her on “islands of
conscious power” rather than go casting her own net about in the
open sea.61
The consumer who purchases groceries, candy, insurance, hotel
stays, or computer software all with a side of coastal cleanup62 of
course is free to patronize a different set of firms not tying their
wares to beach cleanup, buy groceries, insurance and candy at a
slightly cheaper price, and then separately make her own donations
to the charities of her choice. It is difficult to tell exactly what
amount of beach cleanup one would be getting with a purchase of
groceries, candy, or software, just as it is difficult to tell how much
beach cleanup one can get with a direct donation. That is to say, it
is difficult for the consumer in these areas to determine prices. The
quantum of the individual consumer’s portion of the corporate
donation with each purchase is so small that the opportunity costs
involved in seeking out and executing atomistic purchases and
donations would far outweigh any efficiency loss in just leaving the
decision making up to an otherwise trusted firm and taking the
corporate bundle.63 The firm-based decisions will not exactly accord
with the consumers’ private preferences, but the consumer has no
better preference-maximizing option in serial spot markets, which
are very costly to negotiate.64 These are precisely the conditions
that Coase explained would cause activity to be brought in-house

60. See id.
61. See D.H. ROBERTSON, THE CONTROL OF INDUSTRY 85 (1930) (describing
business corporations as “islands of conscious power in this ocean of
unconscious co-operation [i.e., the price mechanism in the market] like lumps of
butter coagulating in a pail of buttermilk.”).
62. See supra Part II.A.
63. See M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and
the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 571, 576–77 (2009).
64. See Coase, supra note 5, at 114–19.
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and managed by fiat, rather than left to the market.65
A similar analysis helps to explain the phenomena of consumer
65. My analysis here bears some resemblance to Henry N. Butler and Fred
S. McChesney’s assessment of corporate charitable giving from the shareholder
perspective in Why They Give at the Office: Shareholder Welfare and Corporate
Philanthropy in the Contractual Theory of the Corporation, 84 CORNELL L. REV.
1195 (1999). Butler and McChesney take as their point of departure the idea
that some corporate philanthropy benefits shareholders because it creates
goodwill for the firm in dealing with workers, consumers, and communities,
leading to more profit opportunities (their example is General Motors
sponsoring a Ken Burns documentary). Id. It is conceivable, Butler and
McChesney argue, that rather than firms giving directly, shareholders could
make donations in their individual capacity, contingent on the recipient noting
their support from “shareholders of GM.” Id. at 1203. This might achieve the
same kind of goodwill for GM, but at a much higher cost. “[I]t is not hard to see
why in fact shareholders wold prefer to give at the office . . . . [T]he firm
already has the earnings (current or past) necessary for the philanthropy.
Distributing the earnings as dividends which [shareholders] can contribute
individually simply imposes an additional transaction cost . . . .
Each
shareholder must send in his [or her] own check; write a letter explaining that
the gift is made in the firm’s name . . . .” Id. at 1203. Consumers benefit from
charitable giving in a similar fashion. To the extent that such giving creates
goodwill for the firm it may more easily attract shareholders, reducing the cost
of capital, or workers, reducing the cost of labor, all of which will reduce the
prices that consumers have to pay for the firm’s goods and services. Individual
consumers could donate to the coastal cleanup in their own name, but then they
lose such collateral benefits. They could make the donation conditional on the
recipient noting support from “consumers of GM,” but in doing so they take on
unnecessary transaction costs. Further, as Butler and McChesney note, if
individual shareholders were to make donations qua GM shareholders, then
nondonating shareholders would free ride on those who make donations
(making would-be donors less likely to contribute, since they anticipate the free
riding). Firm-based philanthropy helps shareholders and consumers alike
overcome this free-riding problem. Butler and McChesney acknowledge that
firm managers may sometimes exploit the firm by donating to charities they
privately prefer rather than charities that would benefit the firm, but such costs
have to be balanced against the gains that are otherwise available through
corporate charitable giving. Id. at 1205.
I am taking the argument a step further to suggest that corporate
charitable giving may serve the private interests of individual consumers
irrespective of the benefits to the firm, in that firms may enjoy transaction cost
advantages over individuals in making charitable donations, even without
considering the impact of such donations on corporate reputation. Large firms
can make it somebody’s entire job to study and manage the organization’s
philanthropic activity. There is some evidence that firms are beginning to make
use of sophisticated metrics to evaluate the utility of their philanthropic
activity, something that is well beyond the capacity of most individuals or
families.
See,
for
example,
materials
collected
at
www.corporatephilanthropy.org, the website for an international organization
of corporate CEOs called the Committee Encouraging Corporate Philanthropy,
which collects research on best practices in corporate philanthropy. See also
Henderson & Malani, supra note 63 (arguing that business corporations
sometimes have a competitive advantage in the supply of “altruism” over
nonprofit and government entities, and urging tax reforms that treat nonprofits
and for-profits more equally).
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loyalty and rewards programs. Rather than holding onto more cash
with which they could buy a greater range of future goods,
consumers in such programs turn over a quantum of future
consumption decisions to the firm and take whatever “ration[s]” the
firm later provides. The consumer is willing to turn these decisions
over to the firm because the opportunity and transaction costs of
open-market activity would leave the consumer with less than she
receives in the end by just taking what firms she knows she already
likes and trusts decide by fiat to give her. This kind of firm-based
consumption corresponds in a sense to economists’ explanation of
the service that conglomerates (firms that own companies in
numerous distinct industries, but not every industry) provide for
capital investors. The conglomerate accomplishes for investors “a
breadth-for-dept tradeoff . . . as the firm selectively internalizes
functions ordinarily associated with the capital market.”66
Consumers similarly trade breadth-for-depth by relying on the
firm’s capacities and expertise to select a limited set of consumption
goods, in exchange for the full breadth of options that are available
in spot markets.
This trade-off makes sense because the
opportunity and transaction costs of open market activity would
leave the consumer with less than if she simply took what the firm
decides to give her.67
IV. REFORMING CORPORATE LAW TO ACCOUNT FOR FIRM-BASED
CONSUMPTION
The ubiquity of corporate charitable giving and consumer
rewards programs makes implausible the view that what consumers
want (or get) from their corporate associations is merely a product or
service on offer, and nothing more, with no relational strings
attached. Consumers rely in ongoing fashion on the fiat of firmbased decision making. This positive assessment can contribute to
the normative case for making firm directors fiduciaries of their
consumers.68 The shareholder primacy norm relies in part on the

66. Oliver Williamson, The Modern Corporation: Origins, Attributes,
Evolution, 19 J. ECONOMIC LIT. 1537, 1546 (1981).
67. Of course, an alternative explanation is that consumers do not benefit
at all from charitable-giving ties or loyalty programs, but rather that such
programs succeed only by manipulating consumer perceptions in the service of
corporate managers or shareholders. Such an alternative explanation is
plausible and would support arguments I have otherwise made for requiring
firms to treat consumers in a fiduciary, rather than an arms-length, fashion.
See Consumer Interest, supra note 4. However, as noted, here I am trying to (at
least temporarily) leave the question of manipulation to the side and am trying
to ground justifications for consumer-oriented firm governance in a more
general theory of firm-based consumption.
68. Note that Coasian analysis of the contours or “nature” of the firm
provides no deductively applicable answers regarding what rights or duties
should run to those stakeholders determined to be inside or outside the firm.
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presumption that consumers manage their interests in corporate
enterprise
through
serial,
arms-length,
fully-determined
transactions (with government regulators as a backstop).69 In fact,
the consumer’s dealings with the firm can be far more relational
than the conventional depiction would lead us to believe. Firmbased consumption decisions can only reliably be in the consumer’s
interest if firm managers are taking consumer interests into account
when making them. If firm managers are charged only with
pursuing shareholder interests then there is reason to doubt that
consumer deference to the firm’s consumption decisions is reliably
well placed.
Moreover, firm-based consumption may put consumer interests
in more direct conflict with shareholder interests than is anticipated
by canonical justifications for the shareholder primacy regime.
Consider the case of rewards programs.
The consumer who
participates in such a program pays a premium on earlier
transactions (rather than taking a cash discount) in order to receive
discounts or perks in connection with future consumption. The
consumer now has a stake in the long-term viability of the firm with
which she has a loyalty association and wants that firm to be
managed in a conservative, risk-averse fashion. Shareholders are
generally thought to be relatively more risk preferring as to the
operations of any individual firm with which they are invested,
given that most shareholders are highly diversified, enjoy limited
liability for firm losses, and receive unlimited upsides from very
profitable firms.70 This conflict bears not only on the survival of
individual firms, but also on business decisions while the firm is a
going concern. Directors of a corporation with many retail outlets
might consider it profitable to close a number of stores, or an airline
might decide it can make more money by shutting down some
routes.
While shareholders may benefit from such a move,
consumers in loyalty programs may find that their points, miles, or
discounts are worth less than when they were earned.71 Bringing

See Oliver Hart, An Economist’s Perspective on the Theory of the Firm, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1757, 1764 (1989) (arguing that the intellectual turn in the
second half of the twentieth century from entity to nexus-of-contract theories of
the firm merely “shift[s] the terms of the debate” from a focus on distinctions
between entities and markets to an assessment of “why particular ‘standard
forms’ [or terms within standard forms] are chosen”).
69. Id. at 258–61.
70. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 114–20 (explaining risk preferences of
diversified shareholders).
71. Some firms’ reward programs purport to reserve the right to
unilaterally change the terms of their programs at any time, at their discretion,
even as to already accumulated “points” or “miles.” See Peter A. Alces &
Michael M. Greenfield, They Can Do That? Limitations on the Use of Change-ofTerms Clauses, 26 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1099, 1103–04 (2010) (citing examples
from JetBlue, Inc., and Orbitz.com, Inc.). Some economists argue that loyalty
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this analysis together with concerns about the incentive (and ability)
that shareholder-primacy corporations have to manipulate
consumer risk perceptions and external regulations, the case for
requiring corporate directors to manage their firms with fiduciary
attention to consumers, in addition to shareholders, begins to look
stronger.
Such an extension of the board’s fiduciary obligations may seem
like a radical proposal at first, but this impression surely fades
when one considers how little is actually required of corporate
directors before corporate law will say their fiduciary duties are
satisfied. Corporate law does not permit courts or law professors to
review the substance of the business judgments that corporate
boards make. Absent fraud or self dealing, courts will not secondguess the business judgment of corporate boards.72 This “business
judgment rule” in corporate law ensures that it is the board, with its
particular institutional expertise, that ultimately has authority over
corporate operations, rather than some other less qualified
While corporate law abstains from substantive
institution.73
evaluation, it nevertheless does impose process obligations on the
firm’s decision makers.
To satisfy fiduciary obligations to
shareholders, corporate law requires directors to deliberate in an
informed and sincere fashion about what course of action will be in
the shareholders’ best interests.74 Imposing such obligations on the
board with respect to consumers would help to ensure that decisions
consumers turn over to corporate boards are made at least with
consumer interests explicitly on the table. Despite the ease with
which these fiduciary obligations may be satisfied, canonical
corporate theory holds that the process obligations do presently
substantially benefit shareholders.75 This mechanism can also pay
dividends to the consumer interest.76
More dramatic approaches to multi-stakeholder corporate
governance are also cognizable. One such possibility would be to
provide consumers with an active voice in corporate governance, by
extending to them the corporate suffrage that shareholders now
exclusively enjoy. Instead of getting soy milk with a side of coastal
cleanup, consumers might get soy milk with a side of coastal

programs “artificially” inflate consumers’ cost of switching from one seller to
another, resulting in higher prices. See Gianluca Faella, The Antitrust
Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates, 4 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 375,
402–03 & n.96 (2008) (noting the issue and citing literature). I explore the
problem of “switching-costs” in Locked-In, supra note 27.
72. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 106–26 (reviewing doctrine of and
justifications for the business judgment rule).
73. Id.
74. See Discourse Norms, supra note 4, at 1236.
75. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 77–100.
76. See Discourse Norms, supra note 4, at 1236.

2011]

A FIRM-BASED THEORY OF CONSUMPTION

465

cleanup and a fraction of a vote in the next corporate election.77
Consumers could be given access to the corporate proxy mechanism,
allowing them to author and vote on “stakeholder proposals”
through a process similar to the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Rule 14-a mechanism, which allows shareholders to
author and vote on “proposals” broadly relating to firm operations.78
Mainstream corporate theorists consider such mechanisms
presently to be only a weak kind of “backup” safeguard even for
shareholder interests,79 but they do provide a bit of backup
protection, which might at least serve as a credible threat against
directors by encouraging them to work hard and honest on behalf of
their consumer stakeholders.
V. COLLECTIVE CONSUMER PREFERENCES FOR SUSTAINABILITY
As this Article was developed for a symposium on the subject of
the “sustainable corporation,” I want to briefly examine some
implications of firm-based consumption and multi-stakeholder
corporate governance for spurring corporate “sustainability” in the
sense of corporate operations that are environmentally sound.80
This issue is distinct from corporate charitable contributions to
environmental projects unrelated to the firm’s business, and is
arguably a much more important issue when it comes to
environmental protection generally.
Some corporations tout
sustainable production as an attribute of the product they are
selling. As I write these words I am sipping on a cup of coffee from
Starbucks, Inc. On the side of the cup it reads: “You. Bought 228
Million Pounds of Responsibly Grown, Ethically Traded Coffee Last
Year. Everything We Do, You Do.” The cup has many slogans on it,
but the one that best encapsulates the point under analysis here is
this: “You and Starbucks. It’s bigger than coffee.” While many
product attributes are difficult for consumers to inspect and verify
on their own,81 the environmental consequences of a good’s
production and distribution dynamics are almost always
unverifiable through individual consumer evaluation.82 Starbucks is
assuring me that the coffee I am drinking has been responsibly
grown—but is this “mere” puffery, or can I take Starbucks’ word for
it?83 Douglas Kysar has argued that even as consumers have in the

77. The loyalty and rewards programs that many firms have in place
suggest that the technological means to track consumer purchases, and
apportion consumers votes in corporate elections, is already available.
78. See Consumer Interest, supra note 4, at 311–12.
79. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 8, at 201–19.
80. See generally Jeff Civins & Mary Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability
and Social Responsibility: A Legal Perspective, 71 TEX. B.J. 368, 369 (2008).
81. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.
82. See supra text accompanying notes 18–19.
83. “Responsibly” is obviously a less tractable concept than is a label
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last several decades developed a “preference for processes” (i.e., a
desire for products made and disseminated with sound
environmental practices), consumer protection laws have been
stunted in their continued focus on advertising relating to the
attributes of end products, failing to require firms to provide
information about the processes through which products are
created.84
If consumers desire sustainable business practices, then firms
charged with attending to consumer interests at the level of firm
governance might adhere to such practices more sincerely than
firms charged merely with pursuing profits for shareholders.
Moreover, addressing consumer preferences for processes at the
level of firm governance might help consumers overcome what I call
“the consumer collective action problem.”85 In surveys, consumers
routinely say that they prefer products that are made in an
environmentally responsible fashion; however, they do not always
put their money where their mouth is: “[t]here appears to be a
significant gap between consumers’ explicit attitudes toward
sustainable products and their consumption behavior. . . . [O]ne
study suggests that though 40% of consumers report that they are
willing to buy ‘green products,’ only 4% actually do so.”86 From the
perspective of revealed preference theory, it might seem that
consumers are not sincere when they tell researchers they prefer
sustainability, given that they are unwilling to actually pay for it.87
But the seeming contradiction between asserted and revealed

specifying the amount of caffeine or sugar in the drink (which, come to think of
it, my beverage is lacking). When I speak of taking the firm’s “word” for it when
it says the coffee it sells is responsibly grown, I am asking if I can trust that the
firm means by “responsible” what I reasonably mean by the word, what workers
involved in the coffee production reasonably mean by the word, and what the
law and ethics generally mean by the word. See Discourse Norms, supra note 4,
at 104 (applying Michael Jensen’s work on integrity to an exploration of the
viability of multi-stakeholder corporate governance).
84. See Douglas A. Kysar, Preference for Processes: The Process/Product
Distinction and the Regulation of Consumer Choice, 118 HARV. L. REV. 525, 641
(2004) (“[The] process/product distinction has been invoked to question the
authority of an importing nation to ban or label products that are developed
using processes deemed objectionable by its citizens; to rationalize ignoring
overwhelming consumer support for mandatory labeling of food products that
contain genetically engineered ingredients; and to narrow the constitutional
conditions under which states may force manufacturers to disclose process
information or to face legal challenges for disclosing false or misleading process
information.”).
85. See Consumer Interest, supra note 4, at 283–85.
86. Michael G. Luchs, et al., The Sustainability Liability: Potential
Negative Effects of Ethicality on Product Preference, J. MARKETING, Sept. 2010,
at 18, 18. See also Kysar, supra note 84.
87. Economists typically treat preferences as being “revealed” by conduct.
Paul A. Samuelson, A Note on the Pure Theory of Consumer’s Behaviour, 5
ECONOMICA 61, 62 (1938).
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preferences may instead be evidence of a collective action problem.
Any one consumer knows that, because of the very marginal impact
of any one product on environmental sustainability, the
environment will only be sustained if other consumers, and not her
alone, are also willing to purchase sustainable products.88 If a
consumer assumes that others will be too selfish to purchase a
(higher priced) sustainably produced good, then she is throwing good
money after bad if she purchases the sustainably produced good: it
costs her more, and the environment will not be sustained anyway.
Somewhat more deviously, if she assumes that other consumers will
pay the premium for the sustainable product, then she may free ride
and purchase the cheaper, unsustainable product, thinking she will
still enjoy a sustained environment because of everyone else’s
consumption habits. Since all consumers are prone to this logical
assessment, nobody ends up paying extra for the environmentally
sustainable products, even though everyone is willing to—and
indeed, would prefer to—but only if they could be assured everyone
else was going to do so as well.
Charging corporate boards with attending to consumer interests
at the level of firm governance provides one way of overcoming this
consumer collective-action problem. If firm directors explicitly
strive to attend to consumer interests and to produce their products
in a way that furthers those interests, they may choose to produce
only sustainable products in a given product category, thus helping
consumers to overcome their collective action problem. This would
be another invocation of the “rationing” program that Coase
identified may sometimes be in the consumer interest.89
This argument is a specific application of the general principle
that government action can help overcome collective-action problems
that otherwise stymie solutions to enduring social problems (like
building roads or providing for national defense).90 It may be wise,
however, to have some kinds of governance decisions made at the
level of individual firms, rather than in state or federal governments
or administrative agencies, none of which can exercise the kind of
informed, specific, and localized “business judgment” that corporate
boards can in their own area of expertise.91
88. This assumes that consumers do not have a fetishistic desire for
products produced with sound processes, in the sense that what they really
desire is to possess products with such transcendent qualities. Rather, what
they want is both to have the basic product and to have environmental
sustainability. See Margot J. Pollans, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The
Market for Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 637–38 (2010).
89. See supra text accompanying notes 53–59.
90. See MANCUR OLSON JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 12–16 (1965).
91. Cf. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT AND THE
CORPORATION (2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract_id=461100 (describing and applying the principle of subsidiarity—the
idea that other things equal decisions should be made at the most local level
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Of course, consumers and other stakeholders do not necessarily
want sustainability. Some consumers, or consumers at some times,
may be indifferent to future environmental conditions.92 To the
extent that this is true, then corporate law may have to find a way
of making some other stakeholders’ interests, beyond shareholders
and consumers (e.g., the community at large or even future
generations) a part of corporate governance concerns.
CONCLUSION
Integrating consumption into theories of the firm, and
considering ways in which corporate law can make firms more
responsive to consumer interests, may contribute to corporate
“sustainability” in more than just the environmental sense.
Corporations are highly useful mechanisms for gathering,
organizing, and deploying resources in socially useful ways. To
sustain the availability of the corporate instrument, we must
safeguard the institution against its own worst inclinations that
might otherwise lead to its untimely demise. Public opinion and
popular political movements on both the right and the left seem to
be fed up with corporations and appear to be galled in particular by
the selfish, myopic nature of corporate operations.93 Among the
reasons for such animosity is undoubtedly widespread
dissatisfaction with the narrow, shareholder-focused agenda of
corporate governance, which has been the driving force behind
pollution of not just the natural environment, but our political
landscape as well.94 This Article has argued that consumers, just
like shareholders, already rely on the authoritative decision making
structure of the firm. Corporate governance reforms, which put
directors into the business of talking about and working for not just
shareholders, but workers, consumers, and other stakeholders,
might contribute significantly to the long-term sustainability of not
just the environment, but also the corporation in our society.

possible, rather than at a distance by hierarchical decision-makers—to
corporate law concerns, although concluding that corporate governance should
have no role other than pursuing shareholder value).
92. See Luchs et al., supra note 86.
93. See EVAN OSBORNE, THE RISE OF THE ANTI-CORPORATE MOVEMENT:
CORPORATIONS AND THE PEOPLE WHO HATE THEM 41–70 (2009).
94. See id.

